concerned with predicting token frequencies is not a rule of (generative) grammar.
This argument is, we feel, unexceptionable, and Labov was wrong in I969 in supposing he was not proposing a radical departure from generative grammar. It is, however, another matter to say that this argument stands as an indictment of variable rules as a useful tool in studying language, because such an indictment is viable only to the extent that the orthodox generative view of language is the only profitable view. In particular, this argument only indicts variable rules if it is correct that linguistic theory must equal grammatical theory and grammatical theory must be based on the definition of a language as a set of sentences. The truth of neither of the latter statements is self-evident, and although much useful work has been done taking these as foundational assumptions, it appears that a lot of other useful work has been and will continue to be done within approaches to language that do not accept these statements as first principles. In short, to show that variable rules are not, strictly speaking, generative rules is not to demonstrate they are of no use in furthering our understanding of language.
In addition to relatively formally stated challenges to variable rLules, such as that sketched above, there have been several of a more substantive kind. Many of these involve conflicting evaluations of the empirical evidence for the existence of inherent variability, as, for example, the continuing debate represented in G. Sankoff (1973) , Cedergreni & Sankoff (I974), Bickerton (1973) , D. Sankoff & Rousseau (1974) and McDaniel (I975). It is not our intention to review all of these issues, nor in general would we presume to attempt to adjudicate the multidimensional conflict between the wave theory and variable rule approaches to the study of linguistic variation and change in process. There is, however, one further a priori criticism of the variable rule method that has been so frequently put forward. It should be countered before we proceed to a more technical critique of the variable rule method. The essence of this argument is the belief that the human mind cannot handle probabilities, at least with respect to linguistic behavior. The clearest statement of the argument is perhaps that expressed by Bickerton:
An obligatory rule says: 'When you recognize environment A, use feature Y' -a straightforward enough operation. A variable rule, however, savs 'When you recognize environment X, use feature Y Z?O0 of the time.' Z does not, of course, represent a precise figure. Labov does not envisage that the behavior of a member of a rule-sharing group will necessarilv be isomorphic with that of all or even any of the other members, though it is true that he docs not expect it to vary much: 'It is unlikely that it will be important for us to know that the copula is deleted 82% of the time by speaker A and 7900 of the time by speaker B ' (1969: 740) . No doubt he would also be prepared to admit that A's 820%, may itself be only an average of scores ranging between sav 77% and 87%. However, in order that the average for his group should remain constant, the why this should be true of humans when it is not true of physical mechanisms whose behavior conforms to probabilistic laws.
To be sure, probabilities are high-powered, abstract mathematical objects and to attribute the ability to deal with probabilities to speakers is to make a strong claim. But strong claims about the nature of the mathematical complexity of the mental-neural abilities that underlie language use are hardly foreign to linguists. As mathematical objects probabilities don't seem to us any more high-powered than the familiar elements of generative grammars, pan-lectal grammars, or what have you.
Secondly, there is empirical evidence that humans do have the ability to learn and apply probabilities quite unconsciously and naturally. The phenomenon of probability learning, including the special case of 'probability matching', is well attested in experimental psychology.
Grant, Hake, and Hornseth (1951) ...
showed that when subjects are asked to guess which of two events will occur, and when these two events occur with unequal probabilities, then the subjects will guess each event in approximately the same proportion as the event actually occurs. This result, which has led to the 'probability-matching hypothesis,' has generated a considerable amount of research to determine why the phenomenon happens, and the conditions under which it does not. The concern about the phenomenon is that such behavior does not conform to a particular type of optimum game strategy, since the maximum number of correct guesses will always occur when the subject guesses the more probable event ioo percent of the time. In other words, it is assumed that subjects are in fact trying to maximize their 'hits' (Garner I962: 84).
Although it is well attested that under certain conditions humans reliably produce probabilistic behavior in response to probabilistic stimuli, there is no general agreement regarding the theoretical explanation of this fact. According to Sternberg (i963: 62):
The validity of this finding and the particular conditions that lead to it have been the subjects of considerable controversy. Partial bibliographies may be found in Edwards (1956, 196I) 
, Estes (I962), and Feldman & Newell (I96I).
The reader should also consult Restle (I96I, Chapter 6) and, for work with several nonhuman species, the papers of Bush & Wilson (1956) and of Bitterman and his colleagues (e.g. Behrend & Bitterman, I96I). The general conclusions to be drawn are that the phenomenon does not occur under all conditions or for all species, that when it seems to occur the response probability mav deviate slightly but systematically from the outcome probability [i.e. the probability of the stimulus], that matching may characterize a group average although it occurs for only a few of the individuals within the group, and that an asymptote may not have been reached in many experiments.
Since human subjects have been shown capable of learning and using probabilistic information unconsciously in at least some non-linguistic tasks, the burden of proof would seem to fall on those who wish to claim that humans cannot learn and apply probabilistic information in the domain of linguistic behavior. So far no experimental or observational evidence for this claim has come to our attention. We conclude that neither probability theory nor the weight of existing psychological evidence condemn things like variable rules as preposterous hypotheses a priori.
VARIABLE RULES: THE ADDITIVE MODEL
The underlying assumptions of variable rules may perhaps be best understood in the context of the historical development of this methodology. This history has two major phases, marked by two principal methodological articles: Labov (I969) and Cedergren & Sankoff (1974) . (In singling out these two articles we intend no slight to other important contributions and contributors to the variable rule methodology.) In the first article Labov proposed what has come to be known as the additive model, and in the second Cedergren and Sankoff suggested that the additive model be supplemented or replaced by one or another version of what they have called the multiplicative model. We will consider in turn the empirical motivations and formal character of each of these models. In presenting his data on token frequencies of contraction and deletion of the forms is and are in the speech of whites and blacks in New York City, Labov noted strong statistical regularities in the frequencies with which certain nonobligatory phonological rules appear to operate depending upon the linguistic environment. For example, in the texts that Labov collected, the rule that contracts 'John is going' to 'John's going' is virtually obligatory for all speakers when the subject NP is a pronoun ('He is going'-+'He's going'). When the preceding NP is not a pronoun, contraction is more likely to occur when the subject NP ends in a vowel than when it ends in a consonant ('Martha's going' is a more likely occurrence than 'Robert's going'). With respect to the grammatical category of the constituent that follows the (possibly) contracting is, contraction is most likely to occur preceding a future in gonna (John's gonna go'), less likely before any other sort of VP ('John's eating'), even less likely before a predicate adjective or locational phrase ('John's happy', 'John's in the bathroom'), and least likely before an NP ('John's a good man'). These observations regarding relative frequencies of utterance tokens hold up reliably across four black teenage and preteenage groups, one group of black adults and one group of white teenagers. The general pattern of these data is summarized in Fig. I The additive model is the one originally proposed by Labov in I969, and we take it up first. All variable rules posit -in addition to the 'variable constraints', which are the weights corresponding to the different linguistic environmentsan 'input' constraint, which may be thought of as representing the speaker's inherent proclivity to apply the rule regardless of linguistic environment. When more than a single type of speaker is being modeled, types of speaker (e.g. classes, sexes, races, or combinations of these or other social categories) may be differentiated by their input constraints. The variable (= linguistic) constraints are generally assumed to be shared tacitly throughout the speech community with individual speakers or homogeneous social groups differing from each other only on the input constraint. This assumption lies back of the common notion (disputed in Kay I978) that variable rules provide the basis for a community grammar that simultaneously captures what is shared and what varies in the speech community: the linguistic constraints are uniform in the community and only input constraints vary from speaker to speaker. This assumption leads to empirical problems which will be discussed later. For the moment it suffices that we bear in mind that in the variable rule methodology the grammars of different speakers (or groups of speakers) in a given speech community may be distinguished, with respect to a particular variable rule, only by having distinct numerical values for the input constraint, never by having distinct numerical weights attached to a linguistic environment.
We are now prepared to develop the additive variable rule model, using for illustration the hypothetical data of expressions like 'Pa'are systematically ambiguous, but the context, if properly specified, always removes the ambiguity. When a particular cell is specified by the context, 'pa,' refers to one particular variable constraint as specified above. When a general rule is given, however, without specification of a particular cell -as in the equations specifying the various variable rule models -an expression like 'Pa' really stands for a variable ranging over all the cells and may be understood to mean 'the constraint from the "a" family relevant to the cell under consideration'.
The symbol 'p' is of course chosen to be mnemonic for 'probability', the notion being that a variable rule is concerned with the probability of a certain step in a derivation occurring. The idea is that there is a weight associated with each variable feature and these are combined by the variable rule into the various probabilities of application in all the possible environments defined by the cells of the table. The decision to interpret variable rules in terms of probabilities has consequences that will be examined presently.
What is the most natural way to assign and combine the numerical weights? Labov's not unreasonable approach boils down to the following. The simplest way to combine weights is to add them. Labov (I969: 738) considered the input constraint to be inherently inhibitory so that the basic tendencv of the rule to apply (regardless of conditioning environment) was given by the expression I -po. There seems to be no good reason to choose i -po over the simpler expression po to represent this quantity and so, following a suggestion of D. Sankoff, we adopt the latter course. This basic tendency is augmented in favorable environments and reduced in unfavorable ones by the relevant weights. Thus the rule begins with the input constraint po and adds or subtracts the weights corresponding to the relevant environments, yielding as the equation for the additive model that the 'po' term is always positive and allows for either positive or negative variable constraints; when some weight pi is negative, the resulting +p, term in (4) will of course be negative also.)
We would like now to see how this model applies to data like those in Table i . In order to do this, however, we must adopt another simplifying fiction. If a probabilistic model is the correct model for a body of observed data, the theory of probability tells us that the observed statistics descriptive of the data will only rarely correspond exactly to the underlying probabilities. For example, if we toss a fair coin ten times, the most likely single outcome is five heads and five tails, but if we do not obtain exactly five heads and five tails we would be foolish to reject i6i the hypothesis that the coin is fair, since the mathematical expectation of precisely this observed outcome, given a fair coin, is a little less than one fourth. The same principle applies to a variable rule. The combination of weights in a variable rule yields a probability of application of the rule. We cannot expect the observed frequencies to correspond exactly to the underlying probabilities even if the model is correct. What is done in practice is to apply a statistical technique to the observed data which is called maximum likelihood estimation. This technique yields for a given body of data and a given variable rule model -in the present instance the. additive model -the set of underlying constraint values most likely to have produced the observed result, assuming that the additive variable rule model is in fact the correct model for the process underlying the observed data. Returning to the coin example, if five heads and five tails are observed, the maximum likelihood estimate of the underlying probability of a head is one half. If six heads and four tails are observed, the maximum likelihood estimate for the underlying probability of a head is o.6; and so on. But if the coin is in fact fair (probability of heads = i) the probability of getting exactly six heads (and four tails) in ten tosses is slightly more than one fifth, which is appreciable when we recall that with the same fair coin the probability of five heads (and five tails) is only about one fourth.
We therefore adopt the fiction for the purpose of exposition that the observed frequencies of Table I have happened to correspond to the single most likely outcome of the model. It must be emphasized that this assumption is made for expository purposes only and that it is not legitimate to make it in practice. (In practice one uses maximum likelihood estimation.) As we have seen, in the coin example the single most likely outcome occurs less than one fourth of the time. Another way to put this is that we are acting as if our observed frequencies are precisely the expected frequencies generated by the model, an event that would rarely occur in practice. Thus, the sample computations given below really relate the predicted frequencies of the model to the underlying constraint values.
For the (fictitious) data summarized in Table I (and recalling that we are treating observed frequencies as predicted frequencies) equation (4) So we really have four equations in just three unknowns, Po,P4 v} P+verb, sincepv and P -verb are automatically determined by P+v and P+verb, respectively in (7).
That is, equations (6) The reader may recall that a system of four linear equations in three unknowns does not in general yield a unique solution, or for that matter any solution, since any three of the equations determines a unique solution and in general, different selections of three equations produce different solutions. However, we chose the fictitious data in Table I Table I , they become identities. Variable rules are really systems of equations which relate the numerical values attached to each individual constraint on rule application to the probability that the rule will be applied under each possible combination of environmental constraints.
The (fictitious) observed frequencies we selected for Table i have the property that there is a constant difference between the corresponding entries in each row and also a constant difference between the corresponding entries in each column. In particular the constant row difference is 0.4 and the column difference is 0.2, as may be verified in the table. The general property that row and column differences are each homogeneous characterizes any set of expected frequencies generated by an additive variable rule regardless of the numerical values of the underlying constraint weights, although as the values of the constraint weights change, the numerical values of the differences will change. As we have observed at some length, observed frequencies will not usually correspond exactly to predicted frequencies even when the rule is correct. On the other hand, the more the observed frequencies depart from any possible set of expected frequencies, the less likely it is that the additive rule is the correct model. This observation gives us a handy, though vague, quick check on the applicability of the additive model. If the obsenred frequencies yield nearly homogeneous row and column differences, we know that the data can be well fit by the additive model; to the extent that i63 the row and column differences are heterogeneous we know that the data cannot be fit well by the additive model.6
Our reason for selecting hypothetical data to exemplify the internal mathematics of the rule was to have a perfect fit of the data to the model in the sense that the (fictitious) observed frequencies and the expected frequencies arrived at by the maximum likelihood estimation procedure were identical. Let us now consider the actual results Labov found for the preceding vowel and following verb constraints, which are the constraints to which he gives major emphasis in his study (Labov In other words, each constraint in the hierarchy outweighs the effects of all constraints below it. If we take sentences with a fixed, then any subset of these with ,B as plus will show the rule apulying in a higher proportion of cases than any subset with ,B as minus. The cross-product with ,B as plus and y, a . . . as all minus will still show a higher value of 0 than the cross-product with / as minus and all lower constraints as plus (Labov I969: 740-I).
It is not important for the reader of this paper to be concerned with the precise meaning of the symbols in Labov's statement (95) as they are not fully specified in Labov's original paper. The words, 'each constraint in the hierarchy outweighs the effects of all the constraints below it', do, however, seem to have the (12), which is most of the titmie? One approach is to truncate, by which is meant simply to rename any 'probahility' that exceeds unit) 'unity' and to rename any 'probability' that comes out less than zero 'zero' (Cedergren & Sankoff 1974: 337) . This solves the problem only in the weak sense of providing a means of getting a predicted frequency between zero and unitx for every cell (Cedergren & Sankoff 1974 : 337), but since the truncation method amounts to an arbitrary transformation of the data to render it mathematically tractable, it cannot be considered a solution of the problem in any, interesting sense.
These drawbacks to the additive model are recognized by Cedergren and Sankoff and they cite them as motivation for developing their multiplicative models. There is an additional drawback to the additive model that Cedergren and Sankoff do not cite explicitly. T'hey mention that 'the additive model has been criticized on the grounds that it posits a numerical computation facility as part of competence' (Cedergren & Sankoff 1974 : 337), and reject this criticisnm, correctly we think, on the basis that it is stubstantially the same as the sort of a prioristic psychological speculation that we rejected above. But there is a related although distinct drawback to the additive model that C'edergren and Sankoff don't point out, and their failure to do so is curious in that (a) this drawback is quite damning and (b) the multiplicative models are not subject to it.
We have seen that in the additive model, linguisticall) unmotivated numerical assumptions must be made before we can interpret the p on the left side of defining equation (4) as a probability. But at least this interpretation, although strained in these ways, is conceivable. If wc consider, however, the underlying constraints posited in this model, we see imnmediately that they cannot possibly be probabilities, since half of them are negative. In fact, the numbers attached to the underlying constraints in the additive model have no interpretation at all. They are 'weights' in an abstract model, but they have no claimed empirical interpretation. They are just some numbers that one calculates on the basis of a data table using an arbitrary rule of calculation to produce a resulting number which is then interpreted as the probability that a speaker will apply the rule. B3ut ihis is not really a probabilistic model, because the basic parameters in the model aire not probabilities. A constraint family in the multiplicative model corresponds to a set of mutually exclusive environmental features and is interpreted as a set of probabilities corresponding to a set of mutually exclusive events.7 In our running example, there are two constraint families, one corresponding to the phonological environment preceding is and one to the grammatical environment following is.8 The first constraint family contains the constraints 'probability of contracting is when preceded by a vowel' symbolized 'Pv' and 'probability of contracting is when preceded by a non-vowel' symbolized 'p-v'. The second constraint family contains the constraint 'probability of contracting is when followed by a verb' symbolized Pverb and the constraint 'probability of contracting is when followed by a word that is not a verb' symbolized 'P-,verb' Now, unlike the additive model, in the multiplicative models there are initially no mathematical conditions placed on the relations among the constraints in a particular family, other than that each be a number between zero and unity.
As we have just mentioned, it is assumed in the multiplicative models that the events represented by the probabilities within a constraint family are mutually exclusive. It is further assumed that each pair of probabilities from different constraint families correspond to independent events. In probability theory, two events are defined as independent just in case the probability of their joint occurrence is equal to the product of their individual probabilities. The probability of winning a daily double, or any other parlay bet, exemplifies this rule for combining probabilities. If there are five equally fast horses in the first race, the probability of winning the first race is one fifth, and if there are four equally fast horses in the second race, the probability of winning the second race is one fourth. To win the daily double, one must pick the winner in both of the first two races. The probability of doing this is the product of one fifth and one fourth, or one twentieth. The usual empirical interpretation of the mathematical definition of independence is that there is no causal connection between the two events. For example, if a racetrack is honest, the outcome of the second race is not affected by the outcome of the first, and conversely. To return to our example, it seems reasonable, at least as an initial assumption, to suppose that the influence of a [8] In general there may be more than a single constraint family at a given linear position, as would be the case in this example if we had also considered, say, the grammatical environment preceding the variably contracted is; this in fact is also an important conditioning factor (Labov I969: 730 ff.).
I69
This The factors of the second term of the right-hand side of (I7) are the individual DON'T APPLY probabilities, while the factors on the right-hand side of (i6) are the APPLY probabilities, which explains the choice of names.
Let us now consider how the underlying parameters of the multiplicative models are related to the probabilities of application generated by these models. That is, we wish now to perform some sample calculations illustrating the inner workings of the multiplicative models in the way that equations (6-8) above illustrated the additive model. We recall that in the additive model, we had to adopt some convention limiting the degrees of freedom in each constraint family. In particular, we assumed that the sum of the constraints in a family was always zero. We saw that when there are just two constraints per family, which is usual but not required in actual applications of the additive model, the result of this convention is that the two constraints are of the same absolute numerical value and of opposite sign. Thus, in our example, two of the five constraints were fixed by this assumption once we knew the other three, reducing the degrees of freedom from five to three (see equations (7) What are the comparable assumptions made in the multiplicative models that yield a unique value of p? Cedergren and Sankoff assume that in the applications model po is the probability that the rule will apply in the most favorable environment (i.e. the environment with the largest entry in the data table), and in the non-applications model they assume that po is the probability that the rule will apply in the least favorable environment (Cedergren & Sankoff 1974: 341) . No [io] In the case of the applications model, applied to a two-by-two data matrix, the four equations, determined (or summarized) by the defining equation ( P, must equal zero. We are therefore assuming in this model that in the least favorable environment none of the linguistic factors makes any contribution to the probability that the rule will apply, the entire contribution being made by the input factor. Again, no evidence or argument is given by Cedergren and Sankoff for this assumption.
l'o return to our example of the two-by-two data table, the assumption has the desired effect of reducing the number of independent parameters to be estimated from five to three, since fixing po equal to the observed p in the most (least) favorable environment has, as we have just observed, the effect of also determining that the variable constraints operating in that environment will both be fixed at uniity (zero). But the cost of this move is to introduce an assumption with clear empirical consequences but no empirical basis. In sum, our first criticism of the multiplicative models is that they may only be made to work by the introduction of an arbitrary assumption.
A second criticism of the multiplicative models involves a fact that the reader may have noted. In the applications model, every linguistic environment i has either no effect on the application of the rule (pi= I) or an enhancing effect (pi<i).
Similarly, in the non-applications model, each linguistic environment i has either no effect on the application of the rule (pi = I) or an enhancing effect (pi < i). Thus an intuitively satisfying property of the additive model is lost: that some linguistic environments may have an enhancing effect on the probability the rule will be applied while others have an inhibitory effect. The additive model had, of course, to be abandoned for different and compelling reasons, as we have noted, but its replacement with the multiplicative models seems to introduce new problems. In the multiplicative models, the linguist is committed either to the assumption that every environment has an enhancing (or zero) effect (nonapplications model) or to the assumption that every environment has an inhibitory (or zero) effect (applications model). These assumptions are tacit, but nevertheless unavoidable in the models proposed by Cedergren and Sankoff. No evidence or argument is offered in support of them. In addition we find them counter-intuitive, but whether or not the reader's intuition agrees with ours on this point, the best that can be said for these assumptions is that they are arbitrary.
Having pointed out certain arbitrary features of each of the variable rule models (additive, multiplicative applications, multiplicative non-applications), we consider now the methodology concerning which rule is to be applied to which set of data. The rule for choosing which variable rule model to use on which set of data is this: try all models and retain the one that fits the data best. This methodological principle is implicit throughout Cedergren and Sankoff's article and almost made explicit in several places. In connection with their analysis of R-spirantization in Panamanian Spanish they say, 'It remains to estimate the feature effects in the variable rule which yield a best fit to this data. Our procedure gives the values in Table 3 The method is to try all known models on each set of data and select the model that fits the given data best. But if the application of these different variable rule models to different corpora of data is to have linguistic significance, there must be some linguistic principle(s) according to which a given model is chosen for a given corpus, for example, 'Use the applications model in phonology and the non-applications model in syntax', 'Use the additive model in isolating languages and the multiplicative models in agglutinative languages', or some such. Unfortunately, Cedergren and Sankoff offer no principled way of matching the type of model used to the type of data analyzed. Moreover, the principle of simply selecting the model that fits the data best raises the spectre of an ever-expanding number of models that might be tried (beyond the three specifically proposed to date) on a given corpus until one was finally found that fit well. For example, many other forms of the multiplicative model may be generated at will beside the applications and non-applications models. Remember that in the applications model, all the coins must come up APPLY for a particular set of data until we find a good fit. The wider the range of models we allow, the more certain we are that some model in the family will fit an arbitrarily chosen corpus of data on the basis of chance alone. The principle for choosing among the three extant models is not only arbitrary in itself, but it renders the limitation to these three models arbitrary. That is, according to the Cedergren and Sankoff principle for matching model to corpus, there is no reason for the analyst to limit himself to the particular three models so far proposed. Rather this principle of choice is an open invitation to the analyst to devise more and more mathematical models until he has an armamentarium sufficient that one of them will model closely any set of randomly generated data. So we find arbitrariness, that is, lack of empirical motivation, not only in each of the variable rule models so far proposed but also in the principle determining which model is to be used on which corpus of data. Even if each of the models were individually immune to criticism, this equivocation would constitute a serious limitation on the realism of the variable rule method. Before a hasty conclusion is drawn on this score, however, it is to be borne in mind that intuitions regarding plausibility are not the most reliable criteria for scientific judgment.
Rousseau and Sankoff have recently introduced a fourth variable rule modelthe logistic model -which they now advocate using in all cases
In the logistic model, no less than in the additive and multiplicative models, it is necessary to make certain (empirically unmotivated) mathematical assumptions to determine a unique value of p. In this model one may either make the same assumptions as in the additive model or require that the mean of log (p,/i -pi) within a constraint family be zero (Rousseau & Sankoff 1976 ).
VARIABLE RULES AND COMMUNITY

GRAMMARI1
If a variable rule is a rule of community grammar, then the mathematical assumptions inherent in published variable rule analyses are incompatible with a pattern of language change which has in fact frequently been observed. An assumption in each of the variable rule models so far proposed is that linguistic constraints and social constraints operate independently, that is, that there is no Unfortunately, this notion of community graminar is shown in many of Labov's data to be contradicted by observed synchronic facts. We will demonstrate below [x2] There have been two exceptions of which I am aware. Cedergren & Sankoff (1974: 347) in their study of r-spirantization in 79 speakers of Panamanian Spanish, checked for uniformity of linguistic constraints by the following procedure. Using social-classlinked input probabilities derived from the variable rule analysis of the full sample of 79 speakers, they calculated expected frequencies for each environment for each speaker. Using a Chi-square test of goodness of fit, which they characterize as too stringent, they found a discrepancy between these predicted and the observed frequencies significant at the 5 %/ level in about 20% / of the informants. Guy's recent study (I975) is a stronger exception in that Guy takes as a central issue the investigation of the degree to which linguistic constraints are shared across speakers Hlis conclusion is that for the variable studied, deletion of final -d and -t in Philadelphia English, the relative strengths of linguistic constraints within a family are widely shared among speakers. (He does not attempt to assess the relative importance of different constraint families across speakers.) It is worth noting that the feature studied by Guy is not one that appears to be the focus of a change in progress.
that it is also contradicted by a pattern of language change commonly observed in real communities.
Labov has often remarked that linguistic constraints are not in fact always uniform throughout a speech community. For example, in discussing the deletion of final dental stops among black teenagers, Labov indicates that the two chief linguistic constraints inhibiting deletion are (i) a morpheme boundary preceding the stop to be deleted (in effect making, the -t or -d the sole phonetic sign of the past-tense morpheme) and (2) Having briefly considered some synchronic empirical limitations on the variable-rule-as-community-grammar theory, we take up some diachronic considerations. The uniform constraints assumption together with the independence of constraints property of all variable rule models jointly entail two empirical predictions with respect to situations of language change that are contradicted by at least most and perhaps all extant empirical data regarding cases of observed change in progress. These are (i) that the probability of application of the rule cannot increase (decrease) in a single environment to the exclusion of all others and (2) that if the relative order of constraint strengths is reversed for a single speaker, it must be reversed for all speakers. After demonstrating that these are in fact consequences of the theory, we will discuss a few empirical examples where they are violated.
In order to show that the two predictions just mentioned are in fact formal consequences of the variable rule theory, it is convenient to show first that, in an important sense, all variable rule models are variants, more precisely, orderpreserving transformations, of the additive model. It will then suffice to show '77 that these predictions are entailed by the additive model, since the generalization to all variable rule models will follow immediately from the fact that the other models are monotone transformations of the additive.
For convenience, equations (4, I6, I7, 21), which define respectively the additive, multiplicative applications, multiplicative non-applications, and logistic models, are repeated as equations (22, Thus we see that the four particular variable rule models so far proposed belong to a general class of models defined by equation (26) in which the application probability is always a monotone function of the sum of the weights assigned to relevant linguistic and social constraints.
The significance of equation (26) for the present discussion is that it allows us to see that the independence of constraints property is the same in all four models. Since all models are transformations-of the additive model, all have the independence of constraints property, as defined in the additive model. Because of this property, any such transformed-additive model is incapable of accounting for a very common situation of linguistic change. Change often begins with an increase or decrease in frequency of rule application in a single environment, that is under a single combination of constraints, while the frequencies in other environments remain stable. Consider the case of two constraint families each containing two constraints: (ko0, ko2) the speakers, say, and (ka., ka2) the linguistic constraints. Is it possible for the rule probability p to change in only one environment? For example, can ko, +ka, change over time while the sums of weights for the other three environments (k02 + ka,, ko I + ka2, ko2 + ka2) remain constant? The answer is no, since if ko, + ka, changes then either ko, or ka, (or both) must change, and the change in one cannot be merely equal and of opposite sign to the change in the other. If, meanwhile, ko2 + ka, and ko, + ka2 are each to remain unchanged, then ko2 must change to compensate for any change in ka,, and k,, must change to compensate for any change in ko0. But then k02 + ka2 must change by an amount equal and of opposite sign to the change in ko,+ka2. This shows that we cannot have a change in one environment only.
This effect is independent of the variable rule model chosen and, of course, of the procedure used to estimate the constraint values from the data. As long as the number of different environments is large enough in comparison with the nuimnber of constraints -and no model is of any interest otherwise -a change in rule probability in one environment implies a change in at least one other environment. According to the mathematics of all the variable rule models, an increase or decrease in application probability in a single environment, to the exclusion of all others, is an impossibility. This theoretical impossibility is, however, a frequent concomitant of actual linguistic change.
A second, and more obvious, consequence of the independence of constraints property is that if constraints become reordered for any speaker, they must be similarly reordered for all speakers. This theoretical constraint is also violated by data of linguistic change in progress.
We have shown that none of the proposed variable rule models accounts for interaction of speaker and linguistic constraints. In particular, we saw that (a) the theory implies that there cannot be a shift of a single individual's or group's usage in a single linguistic environment while other groups and environments remain stable, and (b) the models imply that if the relative strengths of two linguistic constraints become reordered over time for one speaker or group of Speakers, they must be similarly reordered for all groups of speakers in the community to which the variable rule applies. We now consider some data.
Perhaps the first of the modern studies of variation and change in progress that employed actual counts of linguistic tokens to get frequencies of rule application was Labov's study of the centralization of the vocalic nucleus 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In the introduction we stated two frequently encountered a priori arguments against the variable rule methodology and attempted to refute them. The first rejects the variable rule methodology -and bv implication any study of comparable data -on the grounds that variable rules govern token frequencies while generative grammar does not countenance token frequencies. We agree that variable rules are not generative rules of a new sort but an entirely different kind of logical object and that generative grammar indeed does not countenance token frequencies. But we are convinced by empirical work conducted within the variable rule paradigm that token frequencies often display clear patterns and that moreover some knowledge of these patterns forms part of the linguistic abilities of speakers. We conclude that, whatever the drawbacks of the variable rule formalism, studies employing variable rules have shown regularities in linguistic behavior that point to a serious lack in the generative paradigm, narrowly defined.
A second line of argument against variable rules which we rejected was based on assumptions about human psychology and about probability theory. The assumption that human beings cannot assess probabilities and behave in accord with them in a natural and unconscious manner appears to be supported by no empirical evidence and does not seem to us plausible a priori. Moreover, experimental evidence to the contrary exists. The argument to probability theory was that a speaker would have to have an internal counting device to keep track of the relative frequencies of linguistic variants that he had heard from his own or other lips in order to behave in accordance with variable rules. But this would require a kind of probability theory that would differ in remarkable and unspecified ways i8i from ordinary probability theory, since the paradigmatic empirical examples of the familiar theory, such as coins, dice, decks of cards, and so on, are not possessed of memories.
In section 2, we introduced the additive model for variable rules. We found that this model requires strong numerical constraints on the underlying parameters, which Labov referred to as the principle of geometric ordering. These are required to keep the 'probability of application' numbers between zero and unity but are not motivated empirically. Cedergren and Sankoff's suggestion that one 'truncate' by transforming the probabilities less than zero to zero and those greater than unity to unity seems less a solution to this problem than a refusal to face it. Most importantly, as Cedergren and Sankoff were undoubtedly aw-are hut unaccountablv failed to point out, the numerical weights attached to linguistic constraints and speaker types in the additive model are not in anysense probabilities. The 'application probability' is of course an algebraic combination of these numbers, and so it is quite unclear in what sense if any it is accurate to call this number a 'probability'. Certainly the usual accoutrements of any normal probability model -a specified random experiment with a specified sample space and a probability measure defined on it -are entirely lacking in the additive model.
The multiplicative models, discussed in section 2, have the great advantage over the additive model of a real probabilistic foundation. They have, however, other drawbacks. The first is that to apply either of these models to actual data unmotivated empirical assumptions must be made. In the applications model, Cedergren and Sankoff assume that the observed frequency in the most favorable environment is equal to the input probability, that is, that the numerical value of each variable constraint operating in the most favorable environment is unity and that the input probability accounts for all of the variation in the rule's operation. No justification is given in support of this belief. It is not explained why the input probability accounts for all the variation rather than, say, half of it -or any other fraction. Similarly no argument is made why all the linguistic constraints operating in this environment are assume(d to have equal effect.
In parallel fashion Cedergren and Sankoff nmake the assumption in the nonapplications model that the linguistic constraints all have a numerical value of zero in the least favorable environment. This assumption is equally rich in unde sirable consequences and equally devoid of empirical foundation. Both assumptions appear to be motivated only by the fact that without some additional assumptions like these, the underlying paraneters cannot be computed from a data table.
A second drawback has to do with interpretation of the multiplicative models. In the applications model, every constraint, linguistic or social, has either no effect on the application probability or an inhibitory effect. In the non-applications model every constraint has either a zero or an enhancing effect. lThus in i8z neither of the multiplicative models can one depict situations in which some linguistic factors variably enhance and others variably inhibit the likelihood of application of the rule.
A third criticism of Cedergren and Sankoff's postulation of the two particular multiplicative models is that these two models are chosen arbitrarily from an indefinitely large family of models. We pointed out that the applications model amounts to tossing a coin for each variable feature and applying the rule only if all coins come up APPLY. In the non-applications model one applies the rule if at least one coin comes up APPLY. But there are indefinitely many possible models in this family: apply if at least half the coins come up APPLY, if at least two thirds come up APPLY, and so on. Taken together with Cedergren and Sankoff's procedure of using whatever model fits the data best, multiplicative applications, multiplicative non-applications, or additive, this raises the spectre of an indefinitely large number of multiplicative models, one of which can be found to fit any set of data well, and the choice amongst which appears to be without empirical foundation or theoretical interpretation. Even without considering the indefinitely large number of multiplicative models implied but not specified by the Cedergren and Sankoff procedure, the practice of applying whichever of the three models fits the data best introduces in itself a serious element of arbitrariness.
We mentioned the recent development by Rousseau and Sankoff of a fourth, logistic, model, noting that as yet this model has not resulted in enough published empirical applications for us to evaluate it fully. Certainly, if use of this model can be justified for all empirical applications to the exclusion of all others, the arbitrariness in choice of model in the previous methodology will be eliminated. This model, like the others, however, is based on empirically unmotivated numerical assumptions and its probabilistic interpretation will doubtless strike some workers as far-fetched from a psychological point of view. This in itself is not much of a scientific criticism, we repeat. In any case experimental or other empirical evidence that human brains can and do make instantaneously the required kinds of calculations -which in the coin model may require an indefinitely long repetition of tosses -has not so far as we know yet been adduced.
Finally, we considered problems arising from the interaction of the variable rule methodology and the notion of community grammar. If variable rules are to be employed as a technique to represent a presumed supra-individual, community grammar, it would appear that the uniform constraints assumption is unavoidable both theoretically and methodologically. That is, if one does not assume that linguistic constraints are shared by all speakers in the community: (I) the notion of community grammar seems to make no sense; (2) the actual study of variable rules in the community breaks down into an individual rule for each speaker. But we found that adoption of the uniform constraints assumption leads to two consequences which are violated by the extant empirical data on language The notion of a linguistic token plays no part in this account. Token frequencies might for Chomsky be a part of the data of a theory of linguistic performance, but so far as we know he has said nothing in print on this point. In any case it seems impossible to alter Chomsky's view of linguistic competence to account for observed patterns in token frequencies without distorting the original concept beyond recognition and usefulness. This is not, of course, to say that data on patterns of token frequencies are not important and interesting data for the linguist, nor to say that the theoretical notion of linguistic competence is without value, but it is probably a mistake to try to extend the formal theory known as generative grammar to accommodate data on token frequencies. Generative grammar is a formalism specifically designed to account for the systematic nature of the set of linguistic types in a language, and we doubt that the theory can be patched by the addition of variable rules to cover the data on token frequencies. As we argued in the introduction, variable rules are not 'like optional rules only a little more specific' but are an entirely different kind of conceptual object. At present it would seem preferable to acknowledge that we have no formal theory of variable data on linguistic tokens than to attempt to graft an account of these data onto a formal theory that was specifically designed for other and contrary purposes. It appears that there simply does not exist currently any formal theory that comes reasonably near to giving a coherent account of the systematicity observed in respect to linguistic tokens.
We have argued that the variable rule methodology represents a premature rush to formal theory, but in criticizing certain of the logical properties and consequences of the particular formal theory we intend no criticism of the excellent empirical work that has prompted it. The quantitative study of variable linguistic features as they are distributed in space, social space and time and as they covary with each other remains, we feel, a major research strategy to follow in seeking a deeper understanding of language change and of the relation of language to the society in which it is spoken. It appears, however, that further empirical work needs to be done before the field will be ready for a fully formal theory of variability in token frequencies that is free of the drawbacks pointed out above.
Variable rule analysis may well serve as an important tool in this empirical work. Here variable rule analysis is not thought of as grammar construction but as the application of a statistical technique, much like traditional analysis of variance but better adapted to the kind of data that arises in empirical linguistic investigations in which many cells of the data table have few or no cases. Viewed thus, as a descriptive and analytic statistical device for the reduction of data on the distribution of linguistic tokens across linguistic environments, speakers, who reads the journals and the CLS volumes must be aware, describing language use has become a concern of many linguists who are, in the broad sense, transformational grammarians' (1977: 407). i85 styles, etc., variable rule analysis may contribute importantly to our increased understanding of linguistic variation, its interaction with social factors, and its intimate involvement in linguistic change.14
